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WORD-MAGIC AND THE EMBEZZLEMENT OF
REAL PROPERTY
ORVILL C. SNYDER*
Can real property be embezzled? If the reader will try this
question on lawyer or layman, he will receive conflicting responses.
To the lawyer, the question seems one for decision under the word-
ing of the embezzlement statute of each state, and nothing more.
To the layman, the social and economic results attendant upon one
or the other answer seem of chief significance. I, as a lawyer
address myself to the legal aspect; but I do this in full recognition
that, if a judicial decision entails immoral, anti-social, or uneconomic
consequences, it is high time for lawyers to re-canvass the processes
whereby that decision was reached, to discern whether after all the
legal auspices themselves have really been read aright.
Can real property be embezzled? In the case of People v.
Roland,' the Second District Court of Appeals in California answers
"yes." In Manning v. State,2 the Supreme Court of Georgia answers
"no." From the laynan's point of view, this divergence transcends
understanding. To him, the lawyer's acceptance of legal verbiage
as a sufficient explanation of the conflict is an irritating example
of that verbal consistency, which Emerson said is never the con-
cern of great minds. But, what difference does it make whether
real property can be embezzled or not?
Importance of Subject-Purpose of Paper
In these days, when a great deal of property is held in trust,
when we have systematic and efficacious campaigns to make people
trust-minded, it may be neither unimportant nor immoral to protect
the interests of the beneficiaries of these trusts by means of the
strong arm of the criminal law. According to the Georgia case,
trustees may sell land which they hold in trust, however unjusti-
fiably, and still escape criminal punishment. They may completely
destroy all claims of beneficiaries to the land by selling to innocent
third parties and, even if judgment-proof themselves so that any
* Raymond Fellow, Northwestern University School of Law. Member of the
Ohio Bar.
1134 Cal. App. 675,'6 P. 2d 517 (1933).
2 175 Ga. 875, 166 SE. 658 (1932).
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civil remedy against them means nothing, escape; for in such a case
only criminal punishment can reach or deter them in any effective
way. That such doctrine should be laid down and followed seems
bizarre in the extreme.8 For the purpose, therefore, of showing
that the Georgia case is both dangerous in its practical results and
fallacious in its reasoning, that it ought not to be followed in other
states as a precedent and ought to be overruled in Georgia, this
paper is written.
There is a further purpose. The California case is ruled on
the sole basis of the peculiar wording of the California Penal Code.
This fact may militate against its general use as a precedent. An
attempt will be made, therefore, to suggest that the decision can
just as well be made to rest on fundamental ideas generally adopted
by courts. Thereby its usefulness as a precedent may be enhanced.
The Judicial Function
Can real property be embezzled? The two cases named stand
alone, it seems, in the United States on the precise question. And,
as some .(those not gifted to see that the law is the perfection of
reason) would say, the courts, as was to be expected, split wide
open. To those who are curious about such phenomena, the most
intriguing aspect of the two judicial performances is the methods
used to discover an answer to the question. All this brings to mind
Justice Cardozo's revelations on the judicial process:
"It [deciding cases] is a process of search, comparison, and
little more. Some judges seldom get beyond that process in any
case. Their notion of their duty is to match the colors of the case
at hand against the colors of many sample. cases spread out upon
their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable
rule. But, of course, no system of living law can be evolved by such
a process, and no judge of a high court, worthy of his office, views
the function of his place so narrowly. If that were all there was
to our calling, there would be little of intellectual interest about it.
The man who had the best card index of the cases would also be
3In these days of trust-mindedness, it might be that even an occupant of
a supreme bench would leave by will the old home farm in trust to his banker
friend so that his honor's wife would be assured of an income in case the testa-
tor is "gathered to his Fathers first." It also is not beyond the realm of supposition
that the will might be proudly exhibited to the said wife. The wife then might
learn of an opinion such as Manning v. State rendered by the selfsame provident
testator. Pribably in such a conjunction of circumstances, only married men,
long calloused in the chains of matrimonial bondage, could imagine what she
would say about this opinion.
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the wisest judge. It is when the colors do not match, when the
references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent,
that the serious business of the judge begins. He must then fashion
law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will
be fashioning it for others. The classic statement is Bacon's: 'For
many times, the things deduced to judgment may be meum and
tuum, when the reason and consequence thereof may trench to
point of estate.' The sentence of today will make the right and
wrong of tomorrow. If the judge is to pronounce it wisely, some
principles of selection there must be to guide him among all the
potential judgments that compete for recognition."
The significant question is. What are matched, words or facts?
Word-Matching vs. Fact-Matching
If the "Man from Mars" were to descend upon us, it seems not
unpardonable to suppose that he would know nothing about apples,
lemons, and oranges. He might be shown a pile of these fruits,
given a sample red apple, a lemon, and an orange, and told to sort
the pile. From the samples he could express in words a test-red,
yellow, orange. If the pile should contain only red apples, lemons,
and oranges, the test would work. But suppose that a second pile
contains yellow apples. No amount of consideration of the words
of the test would ever enable him to separate the yellow apples
from the lemons. But he could go to his samples, the things already
determined to be apples, lemons, and oranges and by studying them
could form a new test, including taste for instance. However, if
some venerable authority had written down the red, yellow, and
orange test in a book many years past, this going back of the words
would probably be considered bad form.
Word-Magic in Larceny Cases
To the practical man-one, as Whitehead says quoting Beacons-
field, who practices the errors of his forefathers-all this is nonsense.
But let us take a matter closely related to the problem of our cases
of People v. Roland and Manning v. State. Let us think about
"man's best friend," the dog. Even to the twentieth century, courts
are struggling with the question whether or not a dog is the subject
of larceny. Coke wrote in his THIRD INSTITUTE that a dog was not
the subject of larceny, Hale repeated in his PLEAS OF THE CROWN,
and Blackstone followed in his COMMENTARIES. That settled it for
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the word-matchers. In a case in which the word t'dog" appeared,
the books were searched for the word "dog." In Regina v. Robin-
son,4 Lord Campbell, C. J., said: "It is clear that dog stealing was
not felony at common law; the reason why it was not is immaterial."
And he then proceeded to wave away a statute. In Ward v. State,5
the court held that a dog was not the subject of larceny, quoting
Blackstone and making remarks reminiscent of Hale about not serv-
ing for food. In State v. Doe,6 the court held that a dog was not the
subject of larceny, citing Hale and Blackstone. In State v. Harri-
ihmn,7 the court held that a dog was not within a statute making
criminal the killing of domestic animals, quoting Blackstone. In
State v. Lymus, the court held that a dog was not the subject of
larceny, relying on Blackstone. But, in Kinsman v. State,9 the
court held that a dog was within a statute making it criminal to
injure property maliciously. In Mullaly v. State,10 the court held
that a dog was within the larceny statute, the unhappy defendant
relying on Coke, Hale, and Blackstone. In State v. Langford," the
court held that a dog was the subject of larceny, relying on tax
statutes in an opinion free from references to Coke, Hale, and Black-
stone, and to English cases. In State v. Brown,"2 the court held
that a dog was within the statute on larceny, but had to struggle
against the weight of Blackstone to do so. The dissenting opinion
of Appleton, J., in State. v. Harriman, is notable for presence of
American authorities and absence of English authorities.3
What, If Anything, Is Behind the Word?
It may be not uninstructive to note that, in these dog cases,
the courts held him within the law of larceny, when they got their
minds on the American cases and statutes-which can be said to be
manifestations of what has been going on here. When they riveted
their attention on the words of Coke's, Hale's, and Blackstone's
pages, they were guided, not by the factual situation existing here
nor by what it was in the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries, but
4 Bell C. C. 34 (1859).
5 48 Ala. 161 (1872).
6 79 Ind. 7 (1881).
775 Me. 562 (1884).
8 26 Ohio St. 440 (1875).
9 77 Ind. 132 (1881).20 86 N. Y. 365 (1881).
1155 S. C. 322, 33 S. E. 370 (1899).
1268 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 53 (1876).
Is See also: Notes, 67 Am. S. t 297, 88 Am. S. R. 588, and 99 A. L. R. 212.
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by words written about what happened then, whether it happened
or not. Thus Blackstone: "As to those animals which do not serve
for food, and which, therefore, the law holds of no intrinsic value,
as dogs of all sorts, and other creatures kept for whim and pleasure,"
there is no larceny, only a base property and civil actions. A foot-
note to Blackstone refers to Hale. Hale adds nothing except "base-
ness of their nature, as mastiffs, spaniels, grayhounds, bloodhounds."
This statement about "baseness of nature" is found in Coke's Timw
INSTITUTE, and a marginal note there (edition of 1648) takes us to
the YE R Booxs of 12, 14, and 18 Henry VIII. In the YEAR BooKs
cited, are found a civif case about herons and shovelers, and a fel-
ony case about a peacock. In the peacock case, the losing side made
reference to mastiffs and spaniels but the argument was rejected,
all the justices holding that taking the peacock was felony. 4 An-
other case 5 is an action of trespass for taking a dog called a "bloud-
hound." Here the argument was made that no civil action lay for
taking the "bloud-hound," because it was said that no appeal of
larceny could be had. It was mentioned that it was no felony to
take a horse in the Isle of Man [It seems safe, since horse-stealing
is not what it used to be, to let this out where erstwhile enterprising
counsel might get hold of it], and all the arguments were made about
whim and pleasure and not for profit, about ferae naturae, about
selling for a large sum, but not the one about not serving for food.
The court held that the action lay.
In passing, it may be observed that Hale seems to have orig-
inated the "serving for food" argument, but not in connection with
dogs. Since he states that young hawks in the nest are the subject
of larceny, he does not seem to have thought the test universal. He
uses the "baseness of nature" argument about the dog, but says
that reclaimed hawks are noble and the subject of larceny. In the
YEAR BOOK case on the "blood-hound," the baseness of nature argu-
ment was heard and inferentially rejected.
Thus, only an argument, unsuccessfully advanced, referring to
dogs in a criminal case on stealing of a peacock and a similar argu-
ment, likewise unsuccessfully advanced, in a civil case on taking a
"blood-hound" were behind the sweeping pronouncement about
"mastiffs, bloodhounds," and "other kind of dogs and cats" in Coke's
pages. And these arguments but asserted that the dog was outside
the law of larceny not because he was a dog but because he was
14 YB 18 Hen. VHI, Mich. 11, f. 2.
15 YB 12 Hen. VIII, Trin. 3, f. 3.
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thought to be kept merely for whim and pleasure rather than for
serious uses or with the prospect of being sold for money. The
dog's character as property had not been decided in any actual
criminal case and the arguments had lost in the civil case which
involved a dog as they had lost in the criminal case involving the
peacock. The point seems to be, and always to have been, not dogs
as such, but dogs having value as a matter of fact, like other
domestic animals having value as a matter of fact. However, the
word "dog" was in the books and that was enough for the word-
matching.
What Shall Govern, Words or Facts?
Value of two kinds is recognized. Pollock & Maitland say that
the value in money of the thing taken was part of composition in
Anglo-Saxon times. After Henry II had introduced the process of
indictment, the line which determined whether or not the thief
should be hanged was drawn at twelve pence, the historians de-
nominating this a re-appearance. Thus, exchange-value must, from
the earliest times, have been known to the law of larceny. The
YEAR BooK case on the peacock discussed use-value, holding
value of this kind enough to support a felony prosecution. Hence,
the value to support a charge of larceny could be either use-value
or exchange-value. What then is the difference-as to the conduct
of the accused, as to the prior relation of the "owner" to the thing
taken, as to the asportation or physical movement of the thing, or
as to value-in the cases of stealing a horse, an ox, or a dog? What
was significant about stealing a horse? If we look at the "facts," at
just what happened, are the significant aspects of stealing a horse
not the same as the most obvious factual aspects of stealing a dog?
Should these govern?
Turning out jobs of word-matching has produced the legal
proposition that stealing an old "plug" of a horse is a crime but
taking a shepherd's dog or a valuable hunting dog is not, although
the shepherd's dog is as useful as the cowboy's best pony and her
pups can be sold for a good price and although a well-trained
hunting dog commands a high figure. Such rules as this afford
what justification there is for the taunt that the law is an ass.
However, the absurd result could have been avoided if, instead of
searching for words in a book, the facts constituting an indubitable
example of larceny, such as a case of "cattle-lifting" or of horse-
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stealing, had been studied for their significant factual aspects and
these matched against the facts obtaining when a dog was taken.
More Judicial Confusion
If a method attending to the "facts" from time immemorial ad-
judicated to constitute larceny had been utilized, the courts need
never to have fallen into the confusion (from which they had to
be rescued by the arm of legislation) in another class of larceny
cases-the taking and carrying away of valuable documents. 16 Here
the wonderful nonsense about "intrinsic value" did the dirt. What
happens when a written instrument to pay money is asported, with
intent, etc.? The owner suffers loss which is measured in money,
loss in exchange-value, by the defendant's unauthorized moving of
a physical thing. Is that not just what happens when a horse or a
piece of lead is stolen? Particularly if the horse or lead is held
by a dealer in those commodities, is the likeness clear. Later, when
horses were taken for the purpose of inducing the offer of a reward
and then returned and the reward collected, the courts held the
taking larceny. 17 The definition of larceny required that the intent
accompanying the taking be to deprive the owner permanently of
his "property." It was thought, under the influence of the "in-
trinsic value" theories, that this meant that the intent must be to
deprive permanently of the physical thing asported. However, no
such intent existed in the reward cases. But the courts decided
that larceny had been committed by using, instead of "property,"
the words "property or its value." They thus achieved an under-
standing of larceny as a working of economic loss to the owner, a
loss measured in money, by the defendant's act of asporting a phys-
ical thing. This is precisely what "cattle-lifting" is and has always
been.
Can Real Property Be Embezzled?
We can now return to our first quest and observe the judicial
process going about finding an answer to the question with which
we started. By one process, the California court arrives at a de-
cision which is calculated to punish the dishonest and protect the
just expectations of those who have entrusted them. By a different
process-a case-law technique as contrasted with a technique of
1- See Hall, LAW T=EFT and Soci y, pp. 41-55.
'7 Commonwealth v. Mason, 105 Mass. 163 (1870); Berry v. State, 31 Ohio St.
219 (1877).
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statutory interpretation-the Georgia court arrives at a different
result.
The California Case
In the California case, a principal conveyed to his agent b
deed a parcel of real estate in trust. Later, upon demand by the
principal-cestui for re-conveyance, the agent-trustee refused, claim-
ing beneficial ownership in full in himself. No question as to the
validity of the trust, no question as to the duty to re-convey on
demand, and no question as to the refusal and disclaimer constitut-
ing conversion, need bother us. The sole question is, is real property
the subject of embezzlement?
In its opinion, the California court points out that the cases cited
to it, with the exception of the Georgia case of Manning v. State,18
are on obtaining property by false pretenses and not on embezzle-
ment. The court found the solvent of its difficulties in the words
of the California Penal Code. The first clause of the first sentence
of section 484 (which defines theft), designates conduct by means
of the words "steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away" and designates
the thing which can be stolen, taken, carried, led, or driven away
with the words "personal property." But the second clause, of the
same first sentence of section 484, designates conduct by means of
the words "fraudulently appropriate property which has been en-
trusted to him," and thus contains the word "property" standing
alone.19 Another section defining embezzlement, section 503, is as
18 The court mentions that the defendant relied on Manning v. State, but does
not discuss the case, although it was the only embezzlement case cited.
19 In the course of the opinion, the court mentions that the defendant relied
upon People v. Cummings, 114 Cal. 437, 46 P. 284 (1896): People v. Folcey, 78 Cal.
App. 62, 247 P. 916 (1926): and Manning v. State. The court calls attention to the
fact that People v. Cummings had been overruled in People v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409,
261 P. 303 (1927); but says that the latter case is not decisive, since it was based
directly upon an amendment to section 532 of the Penal Code made after People
v. Cummings had been decided. A quotation from People v. Folcey will make
this distinction clearer: "The Legislature, after the decision of the case of People
v. Cummings, 114 Cal. 437, 46 P. 284, amended section 532 by inserting the words
'whether real or personal' and neglected entirely in said section to make any
other amendment whatsoever. In People v. Cummings, supra, the Supreme Court
stated directly that, since real estate is not the subject of larceny, the words
'punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the
money or property so obtained' are meaningless in relation to real property."
The Court of Appeal, by this line of reasoning in People v. Folcey, held, even
after the amendment, that real property is not included in the false pretenses
section; but, as the court in People v. Roland pointed out, the Supreme Court
held in People v. Rabe, that it is. Continuing in People v. Roland, the court cites
People v. Maddux, 102 Cal. App. 169, 282 P. 996 (1929) in which the defendant
relied on People v. Cummings and People v. Folcey but the court followed People
v. Rabe. (It must be remembered that all these cases are on obtaining by false
pretenses.)
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follows: "Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of prop-
erty by a person to whom it has been entrusted." At this point,
the court was much in doubt as to whether or not the word "prop-
erty" must be held to have the same meaning, in the two places
where it stood alone as the words "personal property" in the first
clause of the first sentence of section 484.0 Their Honors then
turned the pages to section 7, subdivision 10 of the Penal Code, and
read: "The word 'property' includes both real and personal prop-
erty." Here they were satisfied that they found conclusive answer
that real property can be embezzled.
21
No notice is taken of the aspect that the conduct condemned
by the first clause of the first sentence of section 484 must embrace
physical movement of a physical thing and, hence, that "personal
property" there designated must be asportable personal property;
nor that the conduct condemned by the second clause of the first
sentence of section 484 and by section 503 may, but need not, em-
brace physical movement of a physical thing and, hence that "prop-
erty" there designated can be.both asportable and non-asportable
property. From the character of the acts condemned, the meaning
of the words designating property is necessarily broader in em-
bezzlement than is the meaning of those designating property in
larceny.
The Georgia Case
The holder of title to real estate conveyed by deed that title to
one Johnson at the instigation and instance of the defendant, Man-
ning. Manning "was holding himself out as a lawyer" and in the
20 The court goes on to cite four cases on obtaining by false pretenses to show
that real property has been held to be the subject of that offense. These cases
are: Morse v. State, 9 Ga. App. 424, 71 S. E. 699 (1911); State v. Eno, 131 Iowa 619,
109 N. W. 119 (1906); State v. Toney, 81 Ohio St. 130, 90 N. E. 142 (1909); and State
v. Blake, 36 Utah 605, 105 P. 910 (1909). Three of the cases support the point, but
State v. Eno is opposite, and is a principal case relied upon by the Georgia Su-
preme Court in Manning v. State to hold that real property cannot be embezzled.
21 The weakness of the case of People v. Roland as a general precedent is
commented on in a note in 8 So. Cal. Law Rev. 44. This reflection is confirmed
by reading State v. Klinkenberg, 76 Wash. 466, 136 P. 692 (1915). In this latter
case, the court had before it a section of the Washington penal statutes similar to
section 7, subdivision 10 of the California Penal Code, and expressly ruled that
such section did not require the interpretation of the word "property" in the
section on obtaining by false pretenses to include real property.
As an interesting commentary on the way lawyers work, it is worthwhile to
note that in People v. Roland the court specifically calls attention that, although
section 7, subdivision 10 was part and parcel of the California Penal Code at the
time, it nowhere appears that it was considered in People v. Cummings, and also
that in People v. Roland no brief referred to the section even so much as to
indicate its existence.
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course of certain transactions with the owner and the owner's wife
in which he purported to be acting as their attorney procured the
transfer of title to Johnson, who was under his influence and con-
trol. The title was then transferred by Johnson to an innocent
purchaser, whereby the owner "lost the title of his property, and
his possession thereof and all of his rights therein forever." This
transfer was made without the owner's knowledge, and without au-
thority. The case is, therefore, one of the sale of real property by
a person holding it in trust to an innocent purchaser. Manning was
ptosecuted as principal in the second degree.
The Georgia statute under which the prosecution was instituted
in Manning v. State reads:
"If any person who has been intrusted by another with any
note, bill of exchange, bond, check, draft, order for the payment of
money, cotton or other produce, or any other article or thing of
value, for the purpose of applying the same for the use or benefit
of the owner or person delivering it, shall fraudulently convert the
same to his own use, he shall be punished by imprisonment and
labor in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor longer than
five years." Sec. 192 of the Penal Code of 1910.
- In the Supreme Court opinion no point is covered except real
property as the subject of embezzlement.22
The court begins its opinion with the ritual, so familiar to all
who have read more than three cases or more than one text on
embezzlement, of recalling that embezzlement is a statutory offense.
It mentions that embezzlement was unknown at common law and
that the statutes were passed to take care of defects in the common
law of larceny, citing Robinson v. State,2 3 to show that Georgia
22 Attention is called to the fact that the Penal Code of Georgia, "by express
terms, limits embezzlement to the acts of public officers and officers and employees
of public and private corporations. A private individual, under the criminal law"
of Georgia, "cannot be guilty of embezzlement, unless he is an officer or an em-
ployee of a corporation. All ordinary bailees, or persons intrusted with the
property of another, who convert the property to their own use, fraudulently, or
who, with a fraudulent purpose, divert property from the uses of the trust, are
guilty of statutory offenses which are defined in a series of Code sections under
the general heading of Fraudulent Conversion, which" Georgia lawyers "com-
monly call Larceny after Trust." The present writer is indebted to the Honorable
Charles H. Garrett for tHe foregoing accurate technical statement on the Georgia
law.
However, important as the specific provisions are in the procedural details of
Georgia prosecutions, the act of "fraudulent conversion" is a species of conduct
and a legal conception common to technical embezzlement and technical fraudu-
lent conversion. In Manning v. State, the court finds it unnecessary to make any
distinction. Hence, for our present purposes, it is correct to treat embezzlement,
larceny after trust, and fraudulent conversion as convertible terms.
23 109 Ga. 564, 35 S. E. 37 (1899).
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embezzlement statutes were enacted "for the purpose of supplying
defects and protection in instances not included under the penal
statutes applying to larceny." It notes that embezzlement has often
been called "larceny after trust," citing four Georgia larceny-after-
trust cases.' It then cites Wharton 5 for the proposition that em-
bezzlement covers only cases which common law larceny does not
include; and Bromberger v. United States, 6 quoting to the effect
that in embezzlement a statute is dealt with and not common law.
The court then cites Hagood v. State,2 7 and says that in that case
"it was held that the words 'fraudulent conversion' are synonymous
with the words 'taking with intent to steal' in ordinary larceny."
The court again refers to Keys v. State to mention that the indict-
ment there termed the offense "larceny after trust," and then adds:
"This is merely mentioned as an indication that section 192 defines
an offense which, if not in its essence a larceny under our code
(italics the present writer's), is of such near kin that calling it lar-
ceny is no substantial misnomer."
Here the court leaves the larceny-after-trust cases and takes
up authorities on obtaining by false pretenses; but it does not men-
tion the change or intimate that this change makes any difference,
as the California court did. The court then quotes from State v.
Eno, to stress the element of larcenous asportation; and cites in
further support People v. Cummings, and two treatises.28 It next
quotes from State v. Klinkenberg, again to stress larcenous asporta-
tion, throws in citations of CoRPus Juis 2 9 and State v. Layman,8
and ends by holding that real property cannot be embezzled.
Queries Suggested By Georgia Case
It is significant that neither California nor Georgia have a stat-
ute making breach of trust, as such, criminal. Since the United
States Supreme Court has said that property not protected by the
criminal law is only partial and imperfect,31 unless it is held that
24 Alderman v. State, 57 Ga. 367 (1876), involving fraudulent conversion of a
hog; Keys v. State, 112 Ga. 392, 37 S. E. 762 (1900), involving fraudulent conversion
of money; Martin v. State, 123 Ga. 478, 51 S. E. 334 (1905), involving fraudulent
conversion of money; and Lewis v. State, 17 Ga. App. 567, 87 S. E. 1087 (1915),
involving fraudulent conversion of money.
25 2 CRumTAx LAw 1489.
26128 F. 346, 350 (1904).
27 5 Ga. App. 80, 62 S. E. 641 (1908).
2 32 Bishop, secs. 476-479; 2 Brown & Hadley Com. 532.
29 25 C. J. 608, sec. 37, note 99a.
s0 8 Blackford (Ind.) 330 (1846).
31 Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R. Co., 166 U. S. 698, 701 (1897).
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land can be embezzled, the beneficiaries of trusts are put to a great.
hazard. But this is not all. If the theory of the Georgia case is
correct, and asportation must be involved for fraudulent conversion
to occur, there would be no difference if a chattel were held in
trust. Let us suppose that an automobile is in a storage garage
and that it is not moved. The title is in A in trust for B, A having
a bill of sale clear on its face. A sells to C, an innocent purchaser,
and gives him a bill of sale. There has been no asportation, al-
though the car is lost to B irrevocably. Is there an embezzlement?
The Georgia Supreme Court evidently thinks not. Such a con-
clusion, necessitated by the reasoning of the Georgia court, justifies
asking a few questions. Why did the Supreme Court disregard
Morse v. State decided in its own state in 1911? Section 37, 25
CoRPus JuRIs 608, is cited and footnote 2 to that section contains
Morse v. State; and the case appears also in the Solicitor-General's
brief. The reason cannot be that this is a decision of an inferior
Georgia court, from which the Supreme Court could not be expected
to take its authorities; for Hagood v. State and Lewis v. State are
cited for support by the Supreme Court.3 2 It is true that Morse v.
State is a prosecution under section 719 of the Penal Code of 1910
and not under section 192; but that point does not seem to be
.decisive or even material, since the court called Morse's offense
obtaining by false pretenses and the Supreme Court relies strongly
on false pretenses cases. People v. Cummings and State v. Eno
were considered in Morse v. State and distinguished on the point
that they dealt with obtaining the fee, whereas Morse was charged
with obtaining possession of real estate under a defectively executed
three-year lease, a mere chattel interest. But if this is the distinc-
tion, asportation is not important. There was no asportation in the
Morse case. If we revert to our supposed automobile case, we may
guess that it is not asportation as a fact but a thing capable of as-
portation that is significant. Still Morse v. State includes no thing
asportable, no possible asportation. Is Morse v. State overruled by
Manning v. State? It would be enlightening had the Supreme Court
considered the case on obtaining by false pretenses in Georgia, in-
stead of taking its cases from Iowa and Washington.
32 It is interesting to note that Hagood v. State, at the point referred to by the
Supreme Court in Manning v. State, deals not with the act of conversion but
with the specific intent which must accompany the act. The court in Hagood v.
State says that "fraudulent conversion" and "taking with intent to steal" are
alike in that both mport an intent which must be found to have accompanied
the act of conversion or the act of taking. Nothing is said about how conversion
is performed nor how taking is done.
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Why, when the Supreme Court rests its decision upon cases on
obtaining by false pretenses rather than upon Georgia larceny-after-
trust cases, does it select the Iowa and Washington cases instead
of State v. Toney in Ohio? Section 37, 25 CoRpus Julis 608, is
cited and footnote 2 to that section contains reference not only to
Georgia's own case of Morse v. State, but also to State v. Toney, to
Moline v. State,33 and to Yoakum v. State.3 4 . State v. Toney appears
also in the Solicitor-General's brief. The statute considered in
State v. Toney is much more like the Georgia statute than are the
statutes of Iowa and Washington in the cases relied upon. The
Iowa statute designates the subject of obtaining by false pretenses
with the words "any money, goods, or other property"; the Wash-
ington statute, with the words "any property"; and the Ohio statute,
with the words "anything of value, or procures the signature of any
person, as maker, indorser, or guarantor thereof, to any bond, bill,
receipt, promissory note, draft, or check, or any other evidence of
indebtedness." The Georgia statute considered in Manning v. State
designates the subject with the words "any money, note, bill of ex-
change, bond, check, draft, order for the payment of money, cotton
or other products, or any other article or thing of value." It seems
that the Georgia statute is more extensive than the Ohio statute;
for "article of value" might refer to property capable of asportation
and "thing of value" include those not capable of asportation. Both
are used. Is one superfluous? The Ohio statute has only "thing of
value."
What is the purpose of the judicial ritual of constant reference
to statutory offense and to dealing with a statute and not with
common law? The re-iteration, in the opinion of Manning v. State,
that the offense of embezzlement was not known at common law,
that the statutes were enacted to escape limitations of common law
larceny, might induce one to believe that the court was about to
announce the wholly reasonable and salutary rule that the language
must be interpreted with these facts in mind and so as to escape the
limitations (to escape which the statutes were enacted), rather than
to imprison the statute within these limitations. It is surprising,
after such a beginning, to see the court prove by these very state-
ments that the common law concept of larceny still governs. Is the
effect of all this to indicate that courts are jealous of legislative en-
actments, and that a defendant accused of a statutory offense must
33 72 Neb. 361, 100 N. W. 810 (1904).
3 68 Tex. Cr. 254, 150 S. W. 910 (1912).
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be exonerated if any construction can be devised which can be
made to do so?
Conversion in Larceny and Conversion in Embezzlement
The interpretation of the pertinent statute in either the Cali-
fornia or the Georgia case can be approached from the point of
view that each proscribes certain types of human conduct. A crime
is always thought of as an act not a thing. In the first clause of
the first sentence of section 484 of the California Penal Code, the
conduct reprobated is designated by the words "steal, take, carry,
lead, or drive away" and the thing stolen, taken, carried, led or
driven away by the word "personal property." The conduct is that
of physically moving some thing.- Now, if the change should be
made that some one had stolen, taken, carried, led, or driven away
an item of personal property, to wit, a credit not evidenced by any
physical instrument, it seems clear that the conduct indicated by the
words is not the same as what must have been done by the accused.
There is no factual way of physically moving the intangible claim.
There could, of course, be asportation of the receipt, note, or any
other instrument evidencing the credit; but if there is no such in-
strument, there can be no act of asportation 5 Hence, the words
"personal property" cannot include such a credit, although, for in-
stance, "personal property" does include such a credit in settling an
estate. This makes sense because our attention is fixed on the con-
duct which is pointed out by the words, not merely on the words.
The meaning so gathered does what the criminal law is supposed
to do, namely, designate what conduct violates the statute. If we
should say that the words designate that kind of conduct which is
the physically carrying away of a physical thing and then say that
it also designates conduct which is the non-physical carrying away
of a non-physical thing, it is impossible to know what conduct or
what things are included or how to obey the law.
All this seems word-magic too. How do we tell? The process
is to take a set of facts which indubitably constitute larceny-the
stealing of a horse or of a wagon, for instance-and match the facts
at bar with the facts of this indubitable case. The process of taking
the word "property" and trying to find what it means leads to con-
fusion, because the word points out one kind of fact in larceny cases
but another kind in construing a will, and perhaps a third in ad-
judicating a bankruptcy.
35 People v. Ashworth, 222 N. Y. S. 24, 220 App. Div. 498 (1927).
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Let us now advert to the second clause of the first sentence of
section 484 of the California Penal Code. Here the conduct con-
demned is pointed out by the words "fraudulently appropriate prop-
erty which has been entrusted to him." Evidently we are dealing
with appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been
entrusted. Then there is a difference because in larceny (see first
clause) the property is not entrusted. Can real property be en-
trusted? Can personal property be entrusted? The answer to both
queries is "yes." Can personal property not a physical movable
be entrusted, as a credit not evidenced by any instrument? And
the answer is "yes." It seems sure then that we have here a com-
plex of conduct different decisively from that designated by the
first clause. The property which can be entrusted is a much wider
category than the property which can be moved physically of the
first clause.
The conduct of the first clause is physically moving a physical
thing. Let us take an indubitable - case of embezzling a piece of
personal property which is a physical thing. A bailee has a wagon
of the bailor in his possession. Can the bailee "convert" or "appro-
priate"3 it by asportation? The answer is "yes." Can he "convert"
or "appropriate" without any physical moving of the wagon what-
soever? The answer is "yes." If the bailee announces to the bailor
that the wagon belongs to him (the bailee) and that the bailor has
no claim to it, even though the bailor is not demanding or trying to
get it and the wagon stands perfectly still, he has converted it.
Hence, the conduct designated by the word "appropriate" in the
second clause is broader than the conduct designated by the words
of the first clause. Suppose that instead of bailor and bailee, we
take a trustee having legal title to the wagon for the benefit of
another. The trustee makes the same disclaimer as above. It is a
conversion or appropriation. How does this conduct, admittedly
embezzlement (if with fraudulent intent, i. e., not in good faith as
under an honest mistake) differ from such a disclaimer by a trustee
of real property? How do the facts at bar match with the facts
of an indubitable embezzlement as to the conduct involved, or eco-
nomic injury produced? What ought we to follow, the associations
of the verbal symbol or the analogies to conduct admittedly con-
demned?
The statute involved in the Georgia case can be viewed in the
3s8 See 30 Ill. L. R. 1004 note 48. "Conversion" is what the "act' in embezzle-
ment is always called.
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same way. One of the cases3 7 cited in the opinion of Manning v.
State emphasizes the distinction that in larceny the possession or
control of the property has not been lawfully obtained before the
conversion, while in larceny after trust or embezzlement the act of
entrusting must have preceded the conversion. Conversion by one
into whose hands the property has lawfully come without any act
of asportation-is well known in that state and has often been there
the subject of adjudications."" How then the Supreme Court mis-
took asportation as an essential element of a defendant's act in
order for him to "fraudulently convert" "any other article or thing
of value" with which "he has been entrusted by another," and how
the court failed to observe that conversion by one entrusted is
different from conversion by one not entrusted, are curiosities for
which it is to be hoped that the court will easily find the means of
correction.
Where We End
This paper, I hope, has suggested, however vaguely and feebly,
that the California case need not be considered as a little, narrow
precedent merely on the precise wording and structure of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code. .It is available for use in any state; for it is in
accord with a broad and practical conception of how a person en-
trusted with property acts to convert it. This conception is part
and parcel of every embezzlement statute in the Union. The sus-
picion has been justified also that the Georgia decision is based
upon a misconception.
We started with the lawyer's and layman's points of view. No
doubt the layman (if one has read this) has had a lot of amusement
over the lawyer's efforts. Whether he has been satisfied or not, he
ought to be content in the thought that we can "bewordle" the
cases to produce results with which the most tendered-minded so-
ciologist can be enraptured just as verbosely as we "bewordle" them
to produce results which give him pains. Surely, there ought to be
37 Martin v. State, Note 24, supra.
38 This is old experience and old doctrine, judicially dealt with and affirmed
in Georgia in Liptrot v. Holmes, 1 Ga. (1 Kelly) 381 (1846); in Maxwell v. Harrison,
8 Ga. 61 (1850); in Young v. Durham, 15 Ga. App. 678, 84 S. E. 165 (1915); and
recognized in "larceny after trust" prosecutions in Martin v. State, 123 Ga. 478,
51 S. E. 334 (1905), and in Lewis v. State, 17 Ga. App. 667, 81 S E. 1087 (1915).
Further, upon non-asportation conversions in embezzlement, it may be ob-
served that failure to account has been held to constitute embezzlement. (See
30 III. L. R. 1005, note 59 for list of cases. Note also the same article, p. 1004, note
48). It has been held that a credit not evidenced by any instrument can be em-
bezzled. (Higbee v. State, 74 Neb. 331, 104 N. W. 748 (1905).) The case of Wein-
handler v. United States (C. C. A. 2d 1927), 20 F 2d 359, is also instructive.
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no difficulty in convincing such a person that the theories which
compete for judicial acceptance all seem the progeny of the law
and that the court is, therefore, not too much hampered in making
its selection by consulting what is honesty and fair-dealing between
man and man. To the hard, practical common lawyer, who snorts
that the law has nothing to do with social uplift and the protection
of incompetents but must be definite and certain, may be left the
task of defining just what this abstract certainty is, just how a legal
rule producing harmful results is entitled to what kind of respect,
and just why the law has nothing to do with the effects of the con-
duct it regulates. When terrific words about certainty and predicta-
bility are hurled at us, we shall perhaps be faced with some very
dull and tiresome fellow, unless our accuser has the insight into
his own mental processes which enables him to laugh a liftle at
himself. As in the situation which "The Virginian" made famous,
it will probably be appropriate to say something about smiling when
those words are used.
